Introduction
Global markets illustrate well Ulrich Beck's (1992) notion of the 'risk society', one marked not by more hazards, but rather a society in which risk itself has become a global discourse and set of practices; 'a gaze' which attempts to bring the future into the present and make it calculable (Horlick-Jones, 2004: 109) . As such, the risk society is increasingly preoccupied with responsibility, safety, and security generated by 'manufactured' risks emerging from new environments for which history provides little experience (Giddens, 1999) . Nowhere is this truer than in financial markets, where periodic crises pose substantial risks to global and national systems. Financial crises have proved far more common than either investors or regulators expected, with 'once-in-a-century' events taking place in quick succession -from the global financial crisis which began with a 'credit crunch' in 2007; the Libor scandal which peaked in 2008; and the Eurozone crisis which emerged in 2009 -all illustrating the far-reaching consequences of spreading manufactured risks around the globe.
The aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis led to mass recriminations against those who allegedly failed to see the new manufactured risks inherent in financial systems. Such recriminations are symptomatic of the moral climate of the risk society, featuring a 'pushand-pull' of accusations of scaremongering on the one hand and coverups on the other (Giddens, 1999: 5) . In the absence of a global regulator to blame for the financial crisis, the three most powerful central banksthe ECB, the Bank of England, and particularly the US Federal Reserve (Fed) -found themselves under immense public scrutiny. Central banks' role as a buffer between state and market interests had offered a unique vantage point from which to 'see' major global risks and assure market stability. Yet the combined actions and inaction of central banks leading up to the crisis made risks less visible and less governable (Vestergaard, 2009) . Specifically, central banks were accused of stoking market excesses through weak governance, inconsistent inflation targeting and 'too easy' monetary policies. The Fed was even accused of helping to contribute to the subprime mortgage crisis by producing the flawed data upon which US government policy devised home ownership loans for the financially excluded (Schwartz, 2012) . Central banks were further criticised for failing to heed the pundits who did predict the crisis (Kirsner, 2012), for compounding the loss of trust during the early days of the crisis by denying markets liquidity, and for collectively refusing to take action as the crisis grew (Warner, 2011) .
This chapter explores risk discourses by deconstructing public recriminations made during a 2008 Congressional hearing into the global financial crisis and the role of US regulators, including the nation's central bank, better-known as 'the Fed'. However, the chapter repositions the Congressional hearing as part of the Fed's own risk management of the US economy. The chapter begins by exploring risk discourses in wholesale financial markets, as well as central banks' techniques for managing attendant risks. The chapter then provides a brief background to the US Federal Reserve, before setting out the methods and materials for deconstructing US Congressional hearings as discursive events, closing with a discussion of themes arising from testimony given by Alan Greenspan, renowned economist and former Chair of the US Federal Reserve.
Central banks in risk discourses
Central banks play a distinctive role in institutionalising patterns of risk in national economies by guaranteeing overall trust in and sustaining the stability of a nation's financial system. Risk management in central banking is primarily carried out through monetary policy -the 'sharp end' of central banking -used to guarantee national money supply, set interest rates, and manage inflation (Irwin, 2013) . Monetary policy encompasses a number of central bank activities, including 'open market operations' or the buying and selling of government bonds in the open market (Shafik, 2013) . Central banks further manage risk by supervising, regulating and scrutinising the nation's banking system with a light-enough touch to maintain the system's vitality, while sustaining the trustworthiness of banks and financial institutions (FCIC, 2010; Woodward, 2000) . Central banks also help maintain financial stability,
